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Missing the Target: Emotion, Stoic Psychology and the Actor 
Cormac Power 
 
This essay offers a reflection upon acting and Stoic psychology. In keeping with the theme of 
this collected edition, I wish to consider the relation between acting and Stoicism in terms of 
failure. Failure in this essay will encompass the notion of “playing emotion” in acting, and 
the central position concerning failure will concern ideas about self-mastery and agency, for 
both actor and Stoic practitioner. The essay will therefore propose a relation between 
Stoicism as a practice, and the practice of acting. The central point of reference for my 
discussion on acting will be Declan Donnellan’s practical acting textbook The Actor and the 
Target (2005). My first task is to offer the reader some thoughts on the ancient philosophy of 
Stoicism, and in doing so, to outline a specific conception of failure that will inform a 
discussion about acting and emotion.    
 
Stoicism was one amongst a number of schools of philosophy operating in the ancient Greek 
world. It was founded by Zeno of Citium around 300 BCE, and apparently drew its name 
from the Stoa, or painted colonnade in ancient Athens, where the school was originally 
founded. Stoicism was subsequently developed by philosophers who led the school in 
Athens, including Cleanthes and Chryssipus, but the large corpus of work produced in the 
period of the early Stoa (Chryssipus alone was said to have written over 300 books), is lost to 
history and only exists in fragmentary form or within later commentaries and biographies.1 
Stoicism continued to flourish in the Roman imperial period, and important works still extant, 
or largely extant, were produced by Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and Musonius 
Rufus.2 Although Stoic philosophers have not enjoyed the enduring prestige of Plato and 
Aristotle for example, Stoicism continues to attract interest within philosophy and a number 
                                                            
1 See for a discussion on the distinctions between Hellenistic Stoicism and Roman Stoicism, C. Gill “The School 
in the Roman Imperial Period” in Inwood (ed.) (2003), pages 33-59. 
2 Musonius Rufus has left us various Discourses, writings collated rather than directly produced by Musonius. 
From Seneca we have various letters and essays. From Epictetus we have Discourses, the Enchiridion as well as 
Fragments compiled by his pupil Arrian. Marcus Aurelius has left us his remarkable work which has become 
known as Meditations.  
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of important texts have been produced on the Stoics in recent years.3  Moreover, an 
expanding body of work on the Stoics has been produced to appeal to a wider audience, 
bringing Stoicism increasingly into the public domain.4  What emerges from this literature is 
a complex set of philosophical ideas, particularly relevant to ethics and moral psychology, 
which is capable of having a great bearing on debates in actor-training.  
 
Sharli Anne Paphitis summarises a commonly held conception of Stoicism, and one that is 
very useful as a means of establishing different readings of this philosophical tradition in 
relation to failure. In the context of an essay on Nietzsche and Nussbaum (who both engage 
with Stoic thought) Paphitis contends: 
For the Stoics, cultivating the capacity for self-control is an attempt to escape the 
contingency and vulnerability of a life lived in the physical world, which must be 
done through a kind of transcendence. This transcendence involves, for the Stoic, a 
rejection or a denial of the importance of those aspects of our lives which are deeply 
vulnerable to […] ‘contingencies and reversals’ (Paphitis 2013: 83). 
In this reading, the Stoics set out to construct, to use Marcus Aurelius’ phrase, an “inner 
citadel” in which to remain immune and unmoved by chaotic flux of existence. A Stoic sees 
herself surrounded by a hostile and threatening world, living in a body that is subject to 
ageing and disease, and caught up in a network of causality over which she has no real 
control. The Stoic, in this account, is a heroic figure. Embattled against a world that must be 
endured, the Stoic seeks to “transcend” - in Paphitis’ terms - that “physical world” in favour 
of an inviolable mental space. Stoicism, then, is conceived of as an anti-failure philosophy of 
life. From this perspective, the Stoic goal is to maintain constancy amidst change and 
vulnerability, and to hold a position which is immune to failure. As Marcus Aurelius puts it: 
                                                            
3 See for example: Sellars, J. (2006). Stoicism (Vol. 1). University of California Press; Becker, L. C. (1999). A new 
stoicism. Princeton University Press; and Graver, M. R. (2007). Stoicism and emotion. University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
4 For example: Irvine, W. B. (2009). A guide to the good life: the ancient art of Stoic joy. OUP USA; Seddon, K. 
(2007). Stoic Serenity: A Practical Course on Finding Inner Peace. Lulu. Com; and Evans, J. (2012). Philosophy for 
Life: And other dangerous situations. Ebury Digital. 
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“You must compose your life action by action, and be satisfied if each action achieves its end 
as best can be: and no one can prevent you from that achievement” (8. 32). In other words, 
even though the results of actions are not for us to control, we can control our sense of being 
“satisfied” by maintaining a state of rational equanimity. From this removed positon of 
unperturbable calm, the Stoic has overcome failure in both a commonplace sense (things that 
go well or go badly are treated with equal indifference), and in a more fundamental sense 
(agency is entirely directed towards the inner goal of maintaining equanimity, and external 
events cannot prevent the Stoic from attaining this objective).  
 
I set forth the above by way of offering a brief sketch of a critical reading of Stoicism. 
Although this critical reading is limited in its conception of Stoicism, it usefully brings forth 
the notion that failure can be positioned in relation to agency. The Stoic realises her agency 
by attaining and maintaining an inner disposition that transcends the possibility of failure. I 
see Stoicism not so much as a philosophy that seeks to transcend the possibility of failure by 
cultivating a passive indifference to the world, but as a philosophy that promotes an active 
engagement with the ever present conditions of failure. As Paphitis’ overview implies, failure 
for Stoics is a failure of agency. Unlike that of Paphitis, my reading of Stoicism finds a 
dynamic and constant attempt to shape and transform our relation to the world. My position is 
informed by a number of “neo-Stoic” authors. John Sellars for instance finds an affinity 
between Stoicism and Deleuzian philosophy. For both Deleuze and for the Stoics, philosophy 
is a practice whose aim is “a transformation of one’s mode of existence or way of life” 
(Sellars 2006: 159). For Delueze, Sellars, argues, the Stoics stand at the “beginning of a 
tradition of immanence within Western philosophy” (2006: 158). It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to develop this neo-Stoic position in great detail, but we can at least note that an 
“immanent” reading of Stoicism offers a very different interpretation of this philosophy than 
the more standard critical position, of which Paphitis stands as an example. Stoicism is not 
about transcending the physical world of contingencies; it is the attention to and 
confrontation with contingency – and failure - that energises the Stoic practice of philosophy.  
 
With respect to agency, one of the great problems that the Stoics address is that of dealing 
with emotions. One of the key challenges to living a Stoic life is the maintenance of 
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tranquillity in the midst of emotional affectivity. From the perspective of the actor and the 
actor’s work, one of the most important factors to consider in relation to failure is the playing 
of emotion on the stage. It is an age-old question. Should actors seek to experience emotions 
onstage? Many practitioners speak of the pitfalls of “playing emotion.” There is also a 
considerable amount of academic writing which considers this issue, both from a technical 
point of view (the different approaches to playing - or to not playing - emotion in 
performance) to wider discussions on what constitutes emotion in the context of acting. Many 
of the ideas developed by the Stoics seem remarkably prescient when considered in the 
context of performance. For the actor, as for the Stoic, the handling of emotion is a delicate 
business, in which there is the ever-present possibility of failure in the enactment of identity. 
 
My main point of focus is the post-Stanislavskian tradition of acting and actor-training. What 
I term a “tradition” here is of course very diverse. Between Sanford Meisner and Mike 
Alfreds, Lee Strasberg and Bella Merlin, there are considerable divergences of approach. 
These differences come into sharp relief when it comes to the issue of emotion in acting. 
What is common to various post-Stanislavskian approaches is that the question of emotion is 
one of central importance to the actor. Furthermore, this problem is deeply connected to the 
artistic agency of the actor in performance. Is the actor in control of her performance at each 
given moment? Is the actor fully “in-the moment” onstage, or is he preoccupied with trying to 
revive an emotional experience in order to fulfil the requirements of a scene? While it is 
certainly of great interest to compare and contrast different practitioners on these questions, 
my main example for analysis will be the British director Declan Donnellan and his book The 
Actor and the Target (2005). Donnellan is particularly interesting, because while he identifies 
very familiar problems concerning emotion in acting, his suggestion as to how the actor 
ought to deal with emotion is very original, and will reward close attention.   
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It is true that the Stoics were famously suspicious of the emotions. According to a clichéd 
view (and indeed, the standard dictionary definition of the term), a Stoic is someone who is 
completely divorced from emotion, maintaining a sense of almost divine detachment from the 
turbulences of the world around them.  While there is a hint of truth in such a 
characterisation, which is implicit in the adjectival sense of the word “stoic,” Stoic 
psychology offers a rich and complex account of what constitutes emotion, and the relation 
between emotion, subjectivity and action. Before examining their position on emotion, let us 
first note the basic ways in which emotion was problematic for the Stoics. As a post-Socratic 
philosophy, the Stoics considered self-knowledge and self-understanding to be a primary task 
of philosophy. They also believed, like Socrates, that a key aim of philosophy was to assist 
the philosopher/student to attain a state of eudaimonia, crudely translatable as happiness, 
though actually meaning something closer to a flourishing life, lived in harmony with one’s 
circumstances. Moreover, in keeping with the Socratic tradition, the Stoics believed that 
eudaimonia needed to be pursued through reason and a life lived in conformity with reason. 
In this regard, emotions could be the cause of impediments to attaining eudaimonia. 
Particularly in the case of emotions concerning desire and aversion, where the individual’s 
psyche is pulled this way and that by attachments to fame, status, possessions, and aversions 
to misfortune, ridicule, a fear of death, and so forth. In this sense, emotions can be 
problematic to the extent that they can interfere with the controlled exercise of the rational 
mind.  
 
The problem of emotion within the context of acting and performance hinges on a related 
principle. While actors are probably not concerned with eudaimonia, one of the problems the 
actor faces in handling emotions is that they are not easily controlled by the will. The actor 
and the Stoic philosopher share a commonality in that both are engaged in shaping an identity 
which is created self-consciously and willingly. An often cited source on acting and emotion  
is an essay called “Le Paradoxe sur le comédien” (1773), by Denis Diderot. Diderot famously 
referred to a “paradox” at the heart of the art of acting. His argument, which is of course a 
well-known one, is that for the actor to successfully convey emotion (of the character) to the 
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audience, the actor him/herself must necessarily be detached from those emotions. The actor 
must not experience the emotions of the character in performance.5  When David Garrick 
plays Hamlet, it is inconceivable to Diderot, considering the array of extreme emotions which 
the character undergoes in so compressed a period (at least in “real time” terms onstage), that 
Garrick could be experiencing those emotions himself in performance. For the purpose of this 
discussion, Diderot articulates a key question in relation to the actor and the playing of 
emotion. Since emotions cannot be controlled and tamed by the will, an actor who actually 
experiences the emotions of the character onstage is liable to produce an inarticulate 
performance. Joseph Roach in The Player’s Passion (1985) demonstrates that Diderot’s 
central idea had also been anticipated by others of the period, set against a context of 
scientific thought as well as under the influence of Cartesian philosophy. An even earlier 
reference point for considering the problematic nature of emotion for the performer, is the 
Platonic dialogue Ion. This short text presents to us Ion, a rhapsode, in dialogue with 
Socrates. Socrates asks Ion various questions about his particular art. Ion’s specialism, indeed 
only specialism, is the performative recital of Homeric poetry, of which he is a famed 
exponent. Socrates asks Ion if he is aware of the emotive effect that he has on audiences. Ion 
replies: 
 
Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various 
emotions of pity, wonder, sternness stamped upon their countenances when I am 
speaking: and I am obliged to give my very best attention to them; for if I make them 
cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of 
payment arrives (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/ion.html).    
 
Although it is problematic to read Ion as straightforward reportage, given the position of 
poetry and performance in Plato’s wider philosophical project, it is nevertheless striking how 
Ion/Ion seeks to probelmatise the relation between the actor and the emotions that are 
presented in performance. Ion’s main interest, we are given to understand, is the (emotional) 
                                                            
 
5 For a detailed treatment of Diderot’s essay, see Elly Konijn’s Acting and Emotions: Shaping emotions on stage 
(2000). 
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effect his performance has on the audience. He continually monitors this effect during 
performance (“I am obliged to give my very best attention to them”), and points to a polarity 
between his personal feelings, and those aroused in the audience. Ion’s posture towards 
emotion has much in common with what Diderot noted with actors in the eighteenth century, 
and indeed bears some similarities to what Bertolt Brecht proposed in the twentieth century.6  
In his essay “Theatre for Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction” (1935) Brecht articulates a 
disjuncture between the feelings evoked in the audience, and those presented on the stage in 
epic theatre:  
The dramatic theatre’s spectator says: Yes, I have felt like that too … I weep when 
they weep, I laugh when they laugh. 
The epic theatre’s spectator says: I’d never have thought it … I laugh when they 
weep, I weep when they laugh (Brecht 1978: 71). 
 
The comparison with Ion is striking; albeit that Brecht shifts the focus from that of performer 
over to the audience. While Stanislavski affirmed the importance of the actor locating 
him/herself as firmly as possible within the inner life of the character, Brecht in contrast 
prioritised a concern for representing the external aspects of the character, and thus suggests a 
form of acting which comes closer to Diderot’s model of the actor, or indeed to Ion. In these 
cases, the aim of the actor is to have a pre-defined effect on the audience. Whether it be the 
stirring up of powerful feeling in the audience as reported by Diderot and Plato, or the more 
complex ideological awakening effects that Brecht sought in epic theatre. A common feature  
across these examples is the need for the actor to maintain a careful relation to emotive 
experience in performance.   
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Also see Konijn (2000), as well as Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe Theatre and Consciousness: Explanatory Scope and 
Future Potential (2005). 
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Yet even within the broadly Stanislavskian theatrical mode of performing, in which the actor 
embodies the character as a psychologically coherent unity, the problem of emotion remains a 
live issue. Scholars such as Sharon Carnicke and Bella Merlin offer a detailed consideration 
of the trajectory in Stanislavski’s work from an exploration of “emotion memory” in which 
actors attempt to graft their own emotional biographies onto the situations confronting the 
character they are playing, to a more physical and spontaneous approach found the “method 
of physical actions” and “active analysis.” The actor’s relation to emotion remained a 
problem that Stanislavski continually worked on; on the one hand Stanislavski stated “There 
is no genuine art where there is no experiencing” (Stanislavski 2008: 28), while on the other 
hand “Don’t follow the line of inner, emotional impulses that know better than you what 
should be done. Follow the line of the life of the human body” (2008: 79).  
 
We can find, then, a general commonality between Stoicism and the western tradition of 
acting with regards emotion. Emotions and their expression require careful consideration and 
handling. Many individual instances of theatre practitioners giving careful regard to 
emotional expression in performance could be given. British director Mike Alfreds, in his 
book Different Every Night which draws largely on Stanislavski, insists that emotion in itself 
is unplayable (Alfreds 2007: 92). American playwright David Mamet is very critical of the 
self-obsessed actor that he (controversially) takes to be Stanislavski’s legacy: “Nothing in the 
world is less interesting than an actor on the stage involved in his or her own emotions” 
(Mamet 1997: 10-11).7 Mamet is particularly taking issue with actors from the Method 
school for whom authentic emotional connectedness with character is paramount. Mamet’s 
point is that the actor should be concerned less with their own feelings, and be more focused 
on the other actors on the stage, while bearing in mind their primary purpose: to communicate 
the play to the audience. As Mamet, Alfreds and Merlin all affirm, the primary task of the 
actor is to play actions; “The actor’s art is the art of action.” (Alfreds 2007: 64). Both Mamet 
and Alfreds are at pains to point out that actions are playable and emotions are not. 
 
                                                            
 
7 For a critique of Mamet’s interpretation of Stanislavski, see Bella Merlin (2000).  
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What of emotions for the Stoics? While as already noted, emotions were in some ways highly 
problematic phenomena for Stoics, it is highly misleading to think that their propositions 
were to attempt to suppress or deny emotional states. As Margaret Graver, in her study on 
Stoicism and emotion points out:   
 
The founders of the stoic school did not set out to suppress or deny our natural 
feelings; rather it was their endeavour, in psychology as in ethics, to determine what 
the natural feelings of humans really are … their aim […] was not to eliminate 
feelings as such from human life, but to understand what sorts of affective responses a 
person would have who was free of false belief. (Graver 2009: 2) 
 
There is much to consider in this short passage above, including what is meant by the concept 
of affectivity in this context, and the relationship between emotion and belief. Before we do 
so, it will be useful to offer a brief definition of the inter-related terms, “feeling,” “affect” and 
“emotion” in this context. Affect is a broad register of experience which includes feeling and 
emotion. Affectivity is also, Graver argues, “an essential part of human nature” (2009: 7; our 
experience of life is always coloured by our sensing of that experience, with all of the 
textures, nuances and moods that accompany the experiencing of experience. Feeling is a 
more pointed form of affectivity. Feeling is shaped by impulse. If I have “a bad feeling” 
about a given situation, then my impulse may be to change that situation or to avoid it. A 
feeling such as this may remain vague, an unsettling background affectivity, perhaps, that I 
do not act upon or pay any great attention to. However, if I fully commit my assessment of 
the situation based on this feeling (that this really is “a bad situation”), then the result may be 
an emotion such as fear. Emotion, then, is feeling, supported by belief. So while both feeling 
and emotion are species of affectivity, the distinction between emotion and feeling becomes 
very important. For Graver: 
The distinction between emotions and feelings therefore serves to open up an 
interpretative space around a central dictum of Stoic ethics” (35).  
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To explore this ethical dimension further, let us sketch the mechanism of emotional 
affectivity according to the Stoics. The Stoics held that our engagement with - or 
consciousness of - the world is mediated by “impressions.” An impression is something akin 
to the modern concept of “perception,” ultimately understood as a physical occurrence 
whereby objects are “imprinted” upon consciousness.8  What we perceive are not objects 
themselves but “impressions” of them. These objects can include material phenomena in the 
external world, but also memories and feelings that arise from within consciousness. Once an 
impression is detected by an individual, a feeling is formed about that impression – 
something like an emotion – and then the individual may choose whether or not to “assent” to 
(or “go with”) that feeling, and act accordingly. For the Stoics, it is not simply that we are 
bombarded with impressions – thoughts, feelings and perceptions – of which we are the 
passive recipients. They wished to emphasise that we have a measure of autonomy in how to 
evaluate and respond to these impressions. Indeed, for the Stoics, human freedom consists 
precisely in realising our power of evaluating impressions.  
 
In reading the Stoics, it is important to understand that many of the experiences that we 
would commonly think of as “feelings” and “emotions” in a more or less interchangeable 
way, are distinguished from one another. This passage from Seneca helps to illustrate:  
Emotion does not consist in being moved by the impressions that are presented to the 
mind, but in surrendering to these and following up such a chance movement. For if 
any one supposes that pallor, falling tears, sexual excitement or a deep sigh, a sudden 
brightening of the eyes, and the like, are evidence of an emotion and a manifestation 
of the mind, he is mistaken and fails to understand that these are just disturbances of 
the body (On Anger: 2.3.1-2). 
As this passage implies, Stoicism does not count all affectivity as emotion – far from it. 
Stoics recognise that affective experience is not something that is under our control; 
“impressions […] are presented to the mind” on a continual basis, and we have little choice in 
this matter. What can we control? We can control the “use” we make of affective experience. 
Perhaps the most striking idea that Graver develops in Stoicism and Emotions is that of 
                                                            
8 For an overview of “impressions” and their relation to other aspects of Stoic psychology, see Tad Brennan 
“Stoic Moral Psychology” in Inwood (ed.) (2003), pages 260-265. 
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“propatheia” or “pre-emotion.” Graver defines pre-emotion as: “an involuntary feeling which 
is not counted as emotion because assent is not given to the relevant impression” (2009: 87). 
We experience a range of affective feelings over which we may have no control in the 
moment of their arising, but we do have a capacity to evaluate these feelings and to choose 
whether or not to “assent” to them. Developing and cultivating this power of assent forms a 
crucial part of Stoic practice. Assent is an important concept in Stoic ethical practice, but it is 
not simply a psychological description of how most people relate to their affective 
experience. As Lawrence Becker argues in his work, A New Stoicism (1999) Stoic 
psychological practice might be likened to physical fitness, agency is like a muscle that must 
be exercised: 
Psychological fitness is analogous, [to physical fitness] and fitness in the case of 
agency proper is the result of increasing the scope, strength, speed, accuracy, stability, 
control, and effectiveness of one’s powers of deliberation and choice” (Becket 1999: 
105). 
 For most of us non-Stoics, and indeed for Stoics – for none of the authors of extant Stoic 
texts claimed to have attained perfection in their practice – this gap between feeling, assent 
and emotion is very difficult to maintain. The process of assent is usually automatic for most 
of us. We are, in Marcus Aurelius’ terms, like puppets pulled this way and that by the “strings 
of impulse” (Meditations VI.16). The concept of “assent,” then, is foundational to Stoic 
ethics. It is a concept that intercedes between feeling and emotion. For it is only after a 
feeling has been assented to, accepted not just as a “bodily disturbance” (in Seneca’s terms) 
but that the feeling is fully aligned with our understanding and interpretation of the world, 
that it becomes – in the strict Stoic sense - an emotion. 
 
The Stoics are suggesting that emotions are ultimately “up to us” and hence are under the 
control of the will. Diderot, as we have heard, maintained that emotions are by their nature 
resistant to the control of the will, and for this very reason it is preferable for the actor to 
avoid indulging in emotional experience onstage. However, one of the consequences of the 
Stoics’ psychological model of affect-assent-emotion, is that a range of affective feelings, 
which we would normally think of as emotions, are merely affective feelings prior to assent. 
Impressions are not subject to the will, but emotions can be subject to our control. The 
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second-century Roman philosopher Epictetus offers some examples of how this mechanism 
works in practice:  
 
Impressions, striking a person’s mind as soon as he perceives something within range 
of his senses, are not voluntary or subject to his will, they impose themselves on 
people’s attention almost without a will of their own. But the act of assent which 
endorses these impressions is voluntary and a function of the human will. 
Consequently, when a frightening noise comes from heaven or in consequence of 
some accident, if an abrupt alarm sounds danger, or if anything else of the kind 
happens, the mind even of a wise man is inevitably shaken a little, blanches and 
recoils – not from any preconceived idea that anything bad is going to happen, but 
because certain irrational reflexes forestall the action of the rational mind. Instead of 
automatically assenting to these impressions … our wise man spurns and rejects them, 
because there is nothing there that need cause him any fear. And this, they say, is how 
the mind of the wise man differs from the fool’s: the latter believes that the 
impressions apparently portending pain and hardship when they strike his mind really 
are as they seem, so he approves … but the wise man, soon regaining his colour and 
composure reaffirms the support he’s always had about such impressions – that they 
are not in the least to be feared, but are only superficially or speciously frightening 
(Epictetus Fragment 9). 
 
The above account of affectivity generally accords with contemporary accounts based on 
neurological research, which suggest that neurological and chemical processes occur in the 
brain producing a range of affective responses before these states can be represented in 
consciousness.9 We are subject to a range of affective responses to multiple stimuli which 
register, or as Epictetus says “impose themselves on people’s attention,” first and foremost as 
physical experiences. These experiences occur in the body before they are conceptualised or 
transformed into mental representations. Furthermore, the Stoics realised that, for the vast 
majority of people, no reflection on these affective feelings takes place, and as a result we 
                                                            
9 See for example Antonio Damasio (2000). 
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tend to “believe [ ] that the impressions … when they strike [the] mind really are as they 
seem.” Hence, affective feeling, in the majority of cases, graduates to the status of emotion 
without having passed any kind of critical examination. For the Stoics, that critical 
examination takes the form of “assent.” Is this feeling which has arisen, on reflection, an 
accurate or fair and objective assessment of reality?10  
 
One might think, in relation to the above examples hinted at by Epictetus, that the feeling of 
fear at the sound of “danger” or the “consequence of some accident” would be a feeling that 
is entirely natural and correct. Yet this is not the Stoic position. Physical harm or even death 
are not in themselves to be feared because things of this kind are, after all, a part of nature. So 
one might initially blanche at the prospect of physical danger, but instead of automatically 
“assenting” to the immediate and involuntary physical response to the situation, the Stoic 
would “regain […] his colour and composure” as Epictetus suggests (Fragment 9), and 
calmly face the consequences of the situation, rather than surrender one’s entire being to a 
state of abject fear and panic. That is not to say, of course, that a Stoic would blithely walk 
into moving traffic, calmly surrendering themselves to the consequences. While it is perfectly 
reasonable to avoid danger where possible and to seek safety, all else being equal, the Stoic 
would not fear physical harm or death per se.11 In this sense, Stoics aim to distance 
themselves from negative emotions and instead cultivate positive emotions. As William 
Irvine notes: 
 
[T]he tranquillity the Stoics sought is not the kind of tranquillity that might be brought 
on by the ingestion of a tranquilizer; it is not, in other words, a zombie-like state. It is 
instead a state marked by the absence of negative emotions such as anger, grief, 
                                                            
10 For instance, in Marcus Aurelius we find the following advice: “Constantly test your mental impressions – 
each one individually, if you can: investigate the cause, identify the emotion, apply the analysis of logic” 
(Meditations VIII. 13).  
11 Stoics distinguished between things that are good, bad and indifferent. “Good” broadly equates with virtue, 
and with activities associated with virtue and its cultivation, whereas “bad” equates to vice and its cultivation. 
All else, including possessions, health and even one’s life, are strictly classed as “indifferents.” However, Stoics 
further distinguished between indifferents that are to be “preferred” as opposed to those indifferents that are 
“non-preferred.” Health is reasonably to be “preferred” over ill-heath, even though it is not an absolute good. 
See Sellars (2006), 110-114.   
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anxiety, and fear, and the presence of positive emotions – in particular, joy (Irvine 
2009: 10). 
 
For the Stoic, realising one’s potential as a human being depends entirely on developing 
one’s ability to transform and adapt our mental life into conformity with nature as a universal 
whole. As Epictetus affirms in his Discourses, the most important attribute of humanity is the 
“ability to make good use of impressions” (I.i.7). Note that what counts here for a Stoic is not 
any sense of external achievement such as fame, glory or the accumulation of wealth or 
power; the only thing that ultimately matters is the use we make of impressions. We find an 
excellent analogy, again in Epictetus. Life is likened to a card game in which we are dealt a 
certain hand; what counts is not the cards we are given (which is down to mere chance), but 
the skill and judgement with which we deploy them. The card player does not think so much 
about winning, but of playing the cards she has been given as astutely as possible (Epictetus 
Discourses II.v.1-6). As a consequence, an outwardly successful life may be deemed a 
complete failure in Stoic terms, while a successful cultivation of Stoic practice may go 
completely unrecognised by our peers who may deem that individual to have lived a 
relatively meaningless life. In this sense, even a slave (as Epictetus himself was as a young 
man), can achieve a pinnacle of human achievement, while an Emperor might be no more 
than a slave to his sensual drives, ego and desire to please his associates. We can see, 
therefore, how important emotion and the use of emotion are to the Stoic in terms of how 
success or failure in life may broadly be measured. 
 
A Stoic viewpoint on emotion opens up a different perspective on the age-old question of 
how actors deal with emotion in performance. From a Stoic perspective, it is not so much a 
question of having or not having feelings, or ignoring the feelings that we experience, but 
rather of how to use feelings in order to develop and strengthen a capacity for agency. The 
actor develops a facility for working with a range of emotional affectivity but must also be 
able to recognise that affectivity for what it is – free floating sensation divorced from her 
actual beliefs about the world. In other words, actors can work with the kinds of feelings 
generated by fictitious characters without having to identify personally with those feelings, 
much as the Stoic practitioner sees feelings as physical occurrences that the individual may or 
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may not choose to make their own through the act of assent. The actor therefore, works not 
with emotion, but with pre-emotional affect.  
 
The point of convergence between Stoicism and those actors and theorists who grapple with 
the problem of the actor’s experience of affectivity, is how to experience feelings without 
becoming attached to them. Diderot’s model of the actor who remains coolly detached from 
the emotional maelstrom of what is happening onstage, might seem superficially to be quite 
“stoical,” but this model is limited in terms of the more complex ways in which the Stoics 
thought about affectivity and emotion. A Stoic-informed approach is to maintain a kind of 
constructive and non-reductive bifurcation between the emotion of the character and the 
experience of the actor.  
 
To further explain this relation between actor, character and emotion, I shall turn to 
contemporary British director Declan Donnellan and his influential book The Actor and the 
Target (2005). Firstly, it is useful to briefly summarise Donnellan’s concept of “the target.” 
In place of more well-trodden Stanislavskian concepts such as the “objective” or the 
“intention,” Donnellan argues that the actor’s attention needs to be placed on a “target.” The 
main difference between a target and an objective or an intention is that the target is external 
to the actor, rather than an impulse or impetus to action that arises from within. Initially the 
distinction seems very subtle. Donnellan’s working examples are mainly drawn from a 
fictitious rehearsal process for Romeo and Juliet, and presuppose the perspective of the actor 
playing Juliet whom he names Irina. Examples he gives of the target in operation include the 
following: I warn Romeo, I deceive Lady Capulet, I open the window. While the verbs 
“warn,” “deceive” and “open” might well be conceived as objectives which connect the actor 
to the object and provide the basis of inner impulse to action, for Donnellan it is the object (or 
target) which is primary: “Romeo,” “Lady Capulet,” or “window.” The 
objectives/motivations are an outcome of the character’s relation to the target. The target can 
be “real or imaginary, concrete or abstract” (2005: 17), and is constantly transforming and 
leading the actor in different directions. What differs in Donnellan’s approach from more 
commonly understood practices based on intentions and objectives, is that whereas the 
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objective serves as an inner motivation to act, the target is outside of the actor and does not 
come from within.  
 
As Donnellan explains, the actor’s energy:  
 
does not come from within, from some concentrated internal centre; it comes only 
from the outside world that Juliet perceives: the breeze that caresses her cheek, the 
marriage she dreads, the lips she desires. The target is all (2005: 25).  
 
The point is that the actor always has her attention on a target: “The target is the master” 
(2005: 27). Furthermore, the target is always “there” waiting to be discovered. Donnellan 
insists that “[t]he actor abdicates all power to the target … The actor can only act in relation 
to that thing that is outside, the target” (2005: 22). 
 
This focus on externality prompts Donnellan to develop a particularly interesting, if rather 
briefly articulated view on acting and emotion. Donnellan agrees with the orthodox view that 
the actor cannot directly play emotion, suggesting instead that “our emotions only express 
themselves through what we do” (2005: 160). For Donnellan, emotion introduces the 
possibility of failure into performance in three senses. Firstly, emotion can reduce clarity of 
purpose: “What we feel always makes what we do more difficult” (2005: 169). Emotion 
impedes our actions. The second problem is that emotion cannot be artificially generated 
“Any attempt to generate feeling independently of the target will paralyse the actor” (2005: 
163). If the actor gets too caught up in the attempt to generate emotion, they are liable to miss 
the target and fall out of the present moment onstage. The third problem that Donnellan 
points to is perhaps the most interesting in terms of psychological observation. The attempt to 
express or embody emotion is always, in a sense, a failure of representation. This is because 
the expression of emotion, for Donnellan, is not the emotion itself; the expression of emotion 
is, in a certain way, less than the emotion. Expressions of emotion therefore fail to embody 
the fullness of emotional affectivity. In fact, Donnellan goes even further than this: “We 
17 
 
cannot express emotion. Ever. Emotion, however, expresses itself in us whether we like it or 
not” (2005: 160). Donnellan develops this idea with the following illustrations: 
 
Even when people appear to express intense emotion, what we actually see is not that 
person expressing feeling but rather their desperate controlling of it. The Arab mother 
keening over her dead son is controlling and shaping her grief into a ritual form so 
that it might express itself. The father appealing on television for news of his missing 
child must control his tears in order to make his plea articulate to be heard. The child 
who jumps in delight to see her soldier father return is controlling her joy in her leap; 
nothing can perfectly express her wild joy, so she just leaps. It’s the best she can do, 
she feels more, but this gesture will have to do. The gesture is always smaller than the 
feeling that precipitates it. (2005: 171) 
 
 
There are two important points to be clear about in our summary of Donnellan. Firstly, 
Donnellan recommends that actors focus on a target, rather than on objectives. The target is 
what the character sees. The target is dynamic and ever-changing. Juliet may see many 
different Romeos at different moments in the play; a Romeo that will protect her, a Romeo 
that will destroy her, a Romeo that she must look after, and so forth. In playing Juliet, Irina 
cannot expect to feel what Juliet feels, but she can try to see what Juliet sees. The target, then, 
determines how Irina will play the character, moment-to-moment, on the stage.  The second 
point for Donnellan is that the emotion of the character complicates the actor’s relation to the 
target. What does Irina do in relation to the emotions that Juliet experiences when she sees 
these various Romeos (targets)? Before assessing Donnellan’s suggestion, it is worth pausing 
to note that the “target” is also an important concept for the Stoic philosopher. Cicero relates 
an analogy concerning an archer. The question is about what the aim of the archer should be; 
should the archer’s success be measured purely in terms hitting the target? Can the archer fail 
to hit the target and yet be a successful exponent of his craft? As Lawrence Becker explains, 
in addressing these questions, Stoics make a crucial distinction between a “goal” and a 
“target.” The archer must attempt to “make a perfect shot” but even in doing so there is 
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always the chance that an unfortunate gust to wind will take the arrow’s course away from 
the target. However, if the archer’s goal was to execute his craft perfectly then he can be 
satisfied to have succeeded in this endeavour, even if the arrow fails to hit the target. Becker 
expands upon this scenario to differentiate between the “goal” and the “target:” 
 
In the case of medicine, the physician can have practiced his art perfectly even though 
he fails to restore the patient to health. Should he therefore have tried to practice 
imperfectly? Surely not … the physician’s goal must be different from – more 
complicated than – simply restoring the patient to health. The latter is the ‘target’ in 
every instance of practising medicine, and in the long run success at hitting those 
targets determines what will count as safe and effective medicine, but the physician’s 
controlling goal in each case is evidently as much to act appropriately as a physician 
… as it is to get a good result in that case … The activity of acting appropriately is 
itself the controlling aim, even though it may not be the target (Becker 1999: 133 
original emphasis).  
 
While the target determines what the individual will do in a given situation, hitting the target 
is not in itself the ultimate criterion of success. It is possible for the archer to hit the target by 
pure luck, at the same time as having failed to execute the craft in a technically secure way. 
In these terms, the Stoics probelmatise the success/failure binary in a very interesting way. 
Failure for the Stoic is always a failure of agency. Our agency is thwarted at every turn; the 
things we try to do often go wrong and the unpredictable upsurge of the world comes back to 
us in the form of complex and involuntary registers of affectivity that can send us off course. 
Epictetus is instructive on this point:   
 
Show me the person who cares how they act, someone for whom success is less 
important than the manner in which it is achieved. While out walking, who gives any 
thought to the act of walking itself? Who pays attention to the process of planning, not 
just the outcome? If the plan works, of course, a person is overjoyed and says ‘How 
well we planned it! Didn’t I tell you, with brains like ours it couldn’t possibly fail? 
But a different result leaves the person devastated, incapable of even finding words to 
explain what happened (II.16.15). 
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We put too much attention onto the outcomes (targets) of our projects, when what is more 
important is the manner in which we set about these projects. The manner in which we set 
about things is more significant for the Stoics than the outcome of our projects, because the 
former can be controlled through an exercise of agency whereas the latter is always to some 
degree left to chance and is therefore outside of our agency. The only ethical point of concern 
is not whether I successfully complete the journey on which I have set out, but in the 
considered manner by which I undertake that journey. Success then, involves an awareness of 
our oneness with the world, a continual recognition of this oneness, and a refusal to see the 
world purely in terms of personal success and self-preservation. The failure of our projects, 
and indeed our failure to live up to our (Stoic?) ideals, is a constant invitation to exercise self-
examination. Failure is the fuel that energises Stoic practice.     
 
On the surface there appears to be a fundamental difference between the Stoic conception of 
the target, and that of Donnellan. While for Donnellan, the target is the master, the Stoic 
insists that the “controlling goal” is far more important than hitting the target, which in the 
ultimate sense is really a matter of indifference to the Stoic. However, Donnellan’s idea of 
the target is distinct from that of the Stoic. The Stoic archer’s target is static, but between the 
archer and the target there is a zone of movement and indeterminacy. In the context of the 
earlier example, the archer’s shot will take place within specific meteorological and 
atmospheric conditions. The archer, therefore, cannot ultimately control whether the arrow 
hits the target, so the Stoic’s advice is to look after only that which can be controlled – the 
correct execution of the task of firing the arrow at the target. Donnellan’s conception on the 
other hand envisages a target which is moving and transforming; all of the actor’s actions are 
reactions to the movements of the target (Donnellan 2005: 66). The target is likened by 
Donnellan to Orlando in As You Like It. Rosalind must see “a specific Orlando.” However, 
“that specific Orlando will change into another specific Orlando … a desperate young 
braggart who takes on the Duke’s wrestler” or a “romantic David who defeats his Goliath, 
then perhaps she sees a lost young man” (23). There are countless Orlandos, and as such the 
target to which Rosalind is playing (leaving aside many other targets besides that embodied 
by the character of Orlando), is a constantly moving one. On another level however, 
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Donnellan’s actor and the Stoic philosopher share a fundamental similarity in terms of the 
task which they face: to modulate one’s subjectivity in relation to the capricious nature of 
circumstances without losing control of one’s sense of agency – artistic agency in the case of 
the actor.  
 
Donnellan’s proposal is that the actor attempt to deal with emotion as though it were an 
adversary to contend with. Emotion intercedes between the actor and her attempts to change 
the target. The target, let us remember, is what the character is seeing at a given moment. As 
Donnellan is primarily interested in the actor’s relation to the target, he is not so interested in 
looking at emotion as either a precondition for action (in the form of motivation), or on the 
later Stanislavkian idea that actions can produce emotion for the actor. For Donnellan, 
emotion is conceived as one of the obstacles the actor faces in addressing the target:  
 
an actor can play as if impeded by emotion. In fact it is impossible for an actor to act 
anything without emotion obstructing it. Love for Romeo makes it more difficult for 
Juliet to express her love towards him (2005: 170). 
 
To understand this passage, we must remember that Donnellan refuses equate emotions with 
their physical expression. Emotions always exceed their expression. In every expression of 
emotion is a failure to capture the full affective force of the emotion. The character’s attempts 
to control the target is complicated by emotional experience because emotion adds a layer of 
difficulty for the character to contend with. Envisaging emotion as an impediment or an 
obstruction to the individual is, at first glance at least, a view that accords with Stoic 
psychology. Of course, Donnellan is not speaking of emotion in the very particular way that 
Stoic philosophy does – of a feeling that has been assented to. However, as we have already 
seen, Stoics do agree that affective feeling produces an impediment to our agency. To go with 
each and every impulse and feeling that we experience is to be exposed to a failure to 
exercise a discriminating agency, to be at the mercy of uncontrolled and unconditioned 
affectivity.   
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At the same time, it is not just a case of recognising emotion as obstruction, as though it were 
a problem to be avoided, or a negative influence to be suffered. Playing emotion as though it 
obstructs action can, in Donnellan’s terms, add colour and detail to a performance, and is 
therefore material the actor works with. If we imagine that the actor is working on an exercise 
of trying to find a lost passport on the morning of an important flight, then the building of 
frustration and desperation will quickly become an obstacle to a clear-headed and thorough 
search. The actor can work with this. How do we control frustration and panic? The question 
may prompt the actor to try “stop her hands shaking,” to “control her breathing,” to “scream, 
breathe and then return to the task of searching.” Perhaps it is not true that emotion always 
impedes action; fear is surely helpful in generating an impetus to flee from danger. But 
combining Donnellan’s casting of emotion-as-obstacle with his observation that any 
expression of emotion is not the emotion itself, but rather the attempt to control the emotional 
feeling, reveals a nuanced psychological position which is a very rich territory for the actor to 
work with. What we see as anger is not the raw emotional state itself but the person’s 
attempts to filter and control this state. These attempts bring about a potential range of 
physical actions and possibilities for the actor.  Donnellan’s advice therefore can be seen as 
both psychologically illuminating as well as liberating for the actor, because it releases the 
actor from questions about how to and whether to play emotion, and instead the actor 
addresses their focus on externals.     
 
Stoic distinctions between affective feeling and emotions can become very useful for the 
actor, and particularly for clarifying aspects of Donnellan’s approach. As we have seen in 
Epictetus Fragment 9 quoted earlier, affective feeling is not really subject to the control of the 
individual; fear, anger and all manner of excitation can take over the body, sometimes 
entirely unbidden by the will of the individual. Emotion, on the other hand, is more difficult 
to talk about in these terms. We think of emotions as being a part of who we are, but the key 
point is not to confuse emotions with (pre-emotional) affective feeling. Viewed through the 
lens of Stoicism, actors principally work with affective feeling, and much confusion arises 
out of a false conflation of affective feeling with emotion. Emotion suggests a connection 
between that affective state and the self; to be in an “emotional state” implies that one’s entire 
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being is thinking, feeling and reacting in the register of the emotional. Diderot’s longstanding 
question remains as to how an actor can apply her trade within this emotional register of 
experience without losing her artistic agency within the process of performance. 
Understanding Donnellan through Stoicism reveals a position that finds a point of 
reconciliation with Diderot’s dichotomy between the actor who the actor who emotes and the 
actor who does not. Feelings are not ignored or held in abeyance but are externalised, and 
treated as affective material to contend with in the generating of actions.    
 
There is an ethical relation between the Stoic practitioner and the actor. Here we must 
distinguish between actor and character. In the Discourses (I. 28), Epictetus suggests that all 
of classical Greek drama, depends for its dramatic quality and very existence as drama, on the 
characters’ failure to “use impressions” correctly. In other words, characters in drama will 
usually lack the agency sought by the Stoic. Had Oedipus, Clytemnestra and Medea practiced 
Stoicism then they might have controlled the impulses which drove them to make destructive 
- and dramatically interesting - choices. For the actor it is different. As we have seen from a 
range of examples, the actor must find a way of maintaining agency even if the character they 
are playing is carried away with desire-driven or vengeful impulse. The actor and the Stoic face 
a world full of events, people and movements that cannot be control. The most famous lines 
from Epictetus are found at the beginning of the Enchiridion (Handbook), where Epictetus asks 
us to distinguish between the things that we can control as opposed to the things we cannot. 
The key to learning to control what we can control is firstly to recognise how little control we 
really have. Too many of us attach our identities to externalities, such as status and material 
possessions. When we do so, we sacrifice our freedom, nailing our agency to the mast and 
allowing the winds to take us wither they will. A natural consequence is the feelings of regret, 
disappointment and alienation that arise when things don’t go as we had hoped, or when we 
lose the things that we felt belonged to us or we were entitled to. Stoics point out that the only 
thing we really own is our capacity for agency. Emotion, which colours so much of human 
experience, stands at the cusp of what we can and cannot control. Stoics insist that emotion can 
be controlled through a rigorous self-analysis and investigation of our belief structure, but 
affective feeling cannot be controlled. Neither can we control much of what constitute our 
identities; including our bodies, certain propensities and externals such as the time and place 
we happen to be born into. Donnellan’s advice to actors is consistent with this broad point. We 
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“can never directly control character or feeling,” the actor ought to “walk away from the twin 
delusions that we decide who we are and that we decide what we feel” (2005: 162).  
 
For both Donnellan and the Stoics, failure is the point at which agency becomes lost through 
the attempt to control that which is outside of our control. For the Stoic, that which lies 
outside of our control includes the external markers of an outwardly “successful” life, 
including wealth and status. The only thing with which we should identify is our capacity for 
seeing the world in the way that we choose; “I must be exiled; but is there anything to keep 
me from going with a smile, calm and self-composed?” asks Epictetus (Discourses I.i.21). 
While the question is a rhetorical one, it is also written as a challenge to the reader. To accept 
and indeed to embrace failure cannot be achieved by reading texts or by understanding 
concepts, but only in the confrontation with situations that demand Stoic attention. Stoicism, 
like acting, is an art of action. We are advised to attend to what is at hand in the present 
moment, to see things for what they are in isolation and in and of themselves, and not to get 
too caught up in anxieties about the unfolding of what might happen in the future. Each 
action leads to a result, one way or another, and another action follows. Good advice for 
actors perhaps. Donnellan’s words at the close of his book come close to this: 
 
We are not here to get things either right or wrong. We are here to do our best. What 
constitutes this best we decide as individuals, having seen the ambivalence of the 
world as clearly and unsentimentally as possible (2005: 272). 
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